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Leonard Meyer's splendid new book, Style and Music: Theory, History and 
Ideology, provides a rich feast of food for musical thought and (inevitably) 
for musical controversy. Theorists will, of course, be drawn to the author's 
nuts-and-bolts functional analyses of the various musical passages he dis-
cusses in making his argument; and music historians, doubtless, will find 
much to stimulate them, as well as to argue about, in his historical charac-
terization of the Classical and Romantic periods in music and of their 
relevant social, political, and philosophical backgrounds. But philosophers 
of art like myself will surely fasten upon Meyer's bold attempt to connect 
the pure musical parameters of syntax and structure to the reigning ide-
ologies with which they co-exist. Nor, I think, will it be out of place to 
concentrate on this attempt in the present review essay; for it is the major 
theme and argument of Meyer's book. 
I call the attempt to connect music and ideology "bold" because-and I 
think Meyer would agree-this is one of the most difficult and contentious 
things to make out in the "philosophy of music." In my view, it is one of 
the two master problems of the discipline, the other, to which it is obvi-
ously related, being the problem of making out exactly what the nature is, 
in the first place, of the aesthetic satisfaction we take in absolute music, 
given that such music seems, at least on the surface, bereft of semantic or 
representational content, and, yet, has come to occupy a place in the 
pantheon no less prominent than that accorded the semantic and repre-
sentational arts. 
It may sound like a platitude, but the central thesis of Professor Meyer's 
book, as I see it, is that musical composition is a process of choice-making. Such 
compositional choice-making is of at least two distinctive kinds: choice 
among the alternatives that a given style allows and choice determinative 
of styles themselves, that is to say, choices that cumulatively change a style, 
as, to take the style change most important to Meyer's book, the composi-
tional choices that eventually traversed the passage from Classic to Ro-
mantic. 
Composing within a style is a matter of choosing available possibilities, 
hedged in by a set of constraints that make the given style identifiable as 
just that style. 'The constraints of style are learned by composers and per-
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formers, critics and listeners." But such learning is seldom the result of self-
conscious instruction; it "is largely the result of experience in performing 
and listening rather than of explicit formal instruction in music theory, 
history, or composition. In other words, knowledge of style is usually 'tacit': 
that is, a matter of habits properly acquired (internalized) and appropri-
ately brought into play" (p. 10). 
Working within a style is, furthermore, a matter of devising what Meyer 
calls "strategies." "Strategies are compositional choices made within the 
possibilities established by the rules of the style. For any specific style there 
is a finite number of rules, but there is an indefinite number of possible 
strategies for realizing or instantiating such rules" (p. 20). The spelling 
out of these strategies-in terms of the possibilities open to the composer, 
the constraints laid upon him or her by style, and the reasons for conse-
quent compositional choices made-is the goal of music theory and style 
analysis. Specifically, style analysis asks, "VVhy do the traits described 'go 
together'?" To explain this, it is necessary to relate the strategies employed 
both to one another and to the rules of the style, including the particular 
ways in which the several parameters interact." And: "Because such rela-
tional sets are understood as being synchronic, style analysis need not 
consider parameters external to music-ideology, political and social cir-
cumstances, and so on" (p. 45). In a word, style analysis is completely self-
contained, completely within the pure musical parameters themselves, as, 
indeed, conventional, "formalistic" wisdom would have it. So far, then, 
there need be no appeal to anything beyond the "game" of music itself. 
But what of style changes themselves and the compositional choices 
involved in effectuating them? Here matters are very different. Analysis 
within a style may be an autonomous discipline. "But the history of style," 
Meyer writes, "cannot, in my view, be explained without reference to as-
pects of culture external to music" (p. 45). Why should this be the case? 
To answer this question we must first observe that the "history of style" is, 
of course, the history of style change. For if style did not change, it would 
not have a history at all. Second, we must ask ourselves why a perfectly 
obvious, and often cited "explanation" of style change, which does not 
require the controversial appeal to extra-musical causes, will not wash. 
The explanation ofw~ich I write is simply appeal to the desire (the innate 
desire?) for novelty. And it will not wash because in explaining everything, 
it in effect explains nothing. Any change, one would think, can be ex-
plained as the satisfaction of the desire for novelty. But since there are 
innumerable ways in which a musical style may change-innumerable di-
rections in which innovation may go-the simple desire for novelty tells us 
nothing about why a musical style changed in the particular ways that it 
did. Classical style could have evolved in countless ways, and the desire for 
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novelty could "explain" all of them. But the question is, Why did it evolve 
into the style we call Romanticism rather than a hundred other possible 
styles? This the desire for novelty or innovation cannot explain. And, on 
Meyer's view, we must reach for factors external to the "game" of the pure 
musical parameters for such an explanation: in a word, to "ideology." 
It is Meyer's working hypothesis that "a musical style changes precisely 
because some of its constraints do not reflect (are not congruent with) 
some of the dominant parameters of the culture in which it exists" (p. 
118). I am going to call this Meyer's global hypothesis of style change, and 
contrast it with two less ambitious hypotheses: the limited hypothesis that 
some musical styles have changed precisely because some of their con-
straints did not "reflect" (were not congruent with) some of the dominant 
parameters of the cultures in which they existed; and the particular hy-
pothesis that Classical musical style evolved into Romantic because some 
of its constraints did not reflect (were not congruent with) some of the 
dominant parameters of the culture in which it existed. Meyer's major 
argument for the global hypothesis is a detailed attempt to establish the 
particular hypothesis. My own suspicion-something beyond a gut reac-
tion but certainly short of firm belief-is that the global hypothesis is false, 
the limited hypothesis at least a possibility, and the specific hypothesis 
quite plausibly defended by Meyer, although there seem to me to be gaps 
in the argument that need filling in. My reasons for all of this will emerge 
as the discussion proceeds. 
How does ideology "explain" style change? In general, the explanation 
goes this way. If ideology and musical style get out of phase-that is to say, 
if prevailing musical style ceases to reflect prevailing cultural ideology-
then the prevailing ideology, presumably shared by the composer, will 
influence him or her to make such compositional choices as counter the 
prevailing stylistic restraints or tendencies in a way to bring style and 
ideology back into phase and make the former again reflect the latter: 
thus old style gives way to new under the pressure of changing ideology. 
Of course it is one thing to enunciate such a hypothesis; quite another 
to convince anyone of it. For it is just here that the skeptical eyebrow will 
be raised. How can ideologies, of all things, be reflected in musical notes-
in the pure parameters of musical structure and syntax? Meyer is well 
aware of how crucial the question is. As he puts it, "if economic, political 
or other [external] circumstances are to influence the history of musical 
style, they must be translated into real, nuts-and-bolts compositional choices 
in such a way that they can affect the choices made by composers" 
(p. 145). And so a large portion of his book is devoted to making such 
"translations," showing how, in musical detail, ideology, for the most part 
Romantic ideology, was translated into real, nuts-and-bolts compositional 
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choices. These nut-and-bolts translations are extensive and rich in analytic 
detail. And one cannot possibly give any but the most sketchy idea of 
Meyer's piling up of detailed examples in the abbreviated format that is all 
a review allows. I shall have to make do here with just a small sampling. 
The over-arching ideological principle of the Romantic movement, ac-
cording to Meyer, is egalitarianism. "At its core," he writes, "was an un-
equivocal and uncompromising repudiation of a social order based on 
arbitrary, inherited class distinctions. This rejection was not confined to 
the arts or philosophy; rather it permeated every corner of culture and all 
levels of society. It was, and is, Romanticism with a capital R" (p. 164). But 
if, as Meyer believes, "a crucial question for the history of music is how 
ideological values are transformed into musical constraints and specific 
compositional choices" (p. 218), then clearly the crucial question at hand 
is how the ideological "repudiation of a social order based on arbitrary, 
inherited class distinctions" can be "transformed into musical constraints 
and specific compositional choices." What, in other words, is the real 
musical pay-off, in the coinage of the pure musical parameters, of a basi-
cally political ideology. 
According to Meyer, as I read him, the link between ideology and the 
pure musical parameters in the Romantic era is disdain for the established 
conventions. In the over-arching political and philosophical ideology it is 
disdain for the unjust establishment of social classes and conventions, the 
most obnoxious symbol of which being the inherited nobility. In musical 
practice, this is reflected in the fact that "ideologically, whatever seemed 
conventional (familiar cadential gestures, commonplace melodic schemata, 
stock accompaniment figures, and so on) was anathema to Romantic com-
posers" (p. 219). 
In Style and Music Meyer considers two ways of "making the claims of 
[Romantic] ideology compatible with the inescapable conventions of tonal 
syntax." The first strategy was to use syntactical constraints and conven-
tions but to "disguise" them. 'The second ... involved the use of means 
less definitely dependent upon constraints and ones less patently conven-
tional" (p. 222). In other words, Romantic composers reflected the ideo-
logical rejection of convention, in the nineteenth century, not merely by 
rejecting musical convention in kind but (more cleverly) by using it in 
camouflage. 
The camouflage was of two kinds: what Meyer calls "disguise through 
emergence" and "disguise through divergence." An example ofthe former 
will have to suffice. 
The last cadence of Debussy's Prelude to the Afternoon of a Faun is "not 
surprisingly, the most decisive closure" in the piece. "Closure is articulated 
by an ostensibly normal ii-V7_1 progression that accompanies two coordi-
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nate melodic closing gestures" (p. 223). The first cadential gesture is com-
pared to another "instance of such a gesture, from the second movement 
of Mozart's String Quintet in E~ Major (K. 614)." Debussy's is "disguised" 
by its organic connection with what goes before, whereas Mozart's is just 
an out-front conventional tag, tantamount to finis at the end of a film. 
"For Mozart's cadential gesture, unlike Debussy's, does not grow out of 
earlier events. Indeed, nothing resembling it occurs earlier in the move-
ment, or does it complete a process begun before. The gesture signifying 
closure is not essentially part of the intra-opus style of this movement, but 
rather part of the dialectic of Classic music. As such, it is unequivocally 
and unashamedly conventional." But in Debussy's cadence: "because the 
gesture grows out of the melodic, orchestral, and textual process that 
precede it, its identity and integrity are masked. And so, as a result, is its 
conventionality" (p. 224). 
Going from the disguise of conventional syntax to its outright rejection, 
Meyer opines that: "the gradual weakening of syntactic relationships, 
coupled with a correlative turning toward a more natural compositional 
means, was perhaps the single most important trend in the history of 
nineteenth-century music." (p. 272). Of this weakening, and even rejec-
tion, Meyer has many carefully worked-out examples, each of which not 
only supports his thesis but invariably casts new light on the music he 
discusses. Of particular importance in this regard is a whole class of non-
syntactic features of music which Meyer calls the "secondary parameters." I 
shall confine my remarks to these. 
Of the distinction between the primary and secondary parameters, Meyer 
writes: 
The primary parameters of tonal music-melody, harmony, and 
rhythm-are syntactic. That is, they establish explicit functional rela-
tionships .... Secondary parameters, on the other hand [e.g., "louder/ 
softer, faster/slower, thicker/thinner, higher/lower"], are statistical 
in the sense that the relationships to which they give rise are typically 
ones of degree that can be measured or counted .... [T]he syntax of 
tonal music, like other kinds of syntax, is rule governed, learned, 
and conventional. The secondary, statistical parameters, on the other 
hand, seem able to shape experience with minimal dependence on 
learned rules and conventions. (P. 209) 
Thus, a musical structure based on the secondary, rather than the pri-
mary parameters would seem more appropriately to reflect the Romantic 
ideology, with its negative attitude towards social stratification and conven-
tions, than would a musical structure based on the primary ones. And so, 
as Meyer maintains, it would be altogether expected that "complementing 
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the trend toward syntactically weakened harmonic and tonal relationships 
[in the Romantic era] was an increase in the relative importance of sec-
ondary parameters in the shaping of musical process and the articulation 
of musical form" (p. 303). 
At this juncture, with Meyer's general argument well in tow, we can step 
back and take a critical look at it. I have two major points to make, the 
first concerning what I have called the particular hypothesis, the second 
concerning what I have called the limited and global hypotheses. 
The particular hypothesis, it will be recalled, is that the parameters 
characteristic of Romantic musical style can be explained by appeal to the 
regnant ideology of the times. The appeal is by way of the concept of 
choice. The argument is that composers have been influenced by their 
beliefs in this ideology to choose those musical parameters that reflect, 
that are in accord with the ideology. And because the Classical parameters 
ceased to be seen by composers as reflecting, as being in accord with the 
Romantic ideology, they chose other strategies that were so seen. 
Now I said at the outset of this essay that the central thesis of Meyer'S 
book, platitudinous though it may sound, is that musical composition is a 
process of choice-making. We are now about to see how crucial, and how 
unplatitudinous this thesis really turns out to be. 
If we want to explain why someone is behaving-or had behaved-in a 
certain way by saying that he or she chose to do it, we must fulfill certain 
necessary conditions for such an explanation. First, we must be able to 
rationally reconstruct a plausible practical argument leading from thought 
to choice. So, for example, if I explain why Rudolph is now waddling 
around on the floor like a duck, going "Quack! Quack!" by saying that he 
chose to do so, and is not (say) under post-hypnotic suggestion or simply a 
nut, I must make good my claim by reconstructing a rational argument 
from what Rudolph believes and wants to a practical conclusion to the 
effect that waddling around on the floor, quacking like a duck, is, under 
the circumstances, the (or a) rational thing for Rudolph to be doing. My 
explanation is: He wanted to entertain his five-year old niece, who was 
crying; so, since he knew she liked ducks and had left her rubber duck at 
home, he decided on the present (undignified) strategy. 
One important thing to notice is that a necessary condition for making 
the rational reconstruction plausible is that the chooser be just the sort of 
person for whom the particular reconstruction, whatever it might be, would 
seem appropriate. Thus if, for example, we knew that Sarah was an ex-
tremely selfish person, a rational reconstruction of the deliberations lead-
ing to her choice to give a million dollars to charity involving benevolent 
motives might be rejected in favor of one involving considerations of tax 
advantage, on the grounds that Sarah is not the sort of person whose 
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deliberations would be likely to involve benevolent motives at all. 
Of course, in giving a rational reconstruction of a practical argument 
leading to choice, we need not necessarily be suggesting that, in the par-
ticular instance, the chooser actually went through the steps laid out. Alice 
chooses to run to her right, rather than her left, in order to answer Jim's 
overhead smash, because she knows that if she does so, she will have a 
fifty-fifty chance of returning the ball, whereas if she stays in center court, 
and waits to see whether Jim hits to the right or the left, it will be too late 
to return the ball at all, no matter which side Jim hits to. But, clearly, 
there is no time for Alice to go through this argument in the heat of the 
moment. Rather, as we say, she has "internalized" this strategy, made it 
"second nature," so that she can act, in the event, instantly, without think-
ing at all. Nevertheless-and this is crucial-if Alice never went through 
either the reasoning process that the rational reconstruction lays out or 
one like it, then I think we would be loath to call her behavior a matter of 
choice. Presumably, there was a time when Alice was taught to go randomly 
to her left or right, and not get caught in center court, because doing that 
would raise her chances of returning a smash from zero to fifty-fifty. She 
understood that this was the rational thing to do, and chose to internalize 
that mode of behavior. On the basis of her once having made this con-
scious choice, we say now that each time she behaves in this way, she 
chooses to do so, for just the reasons cited. However, had she never enter-
tained any practical argument leading to this mode of behavior as its 
conclusion, had she been born doing this, then, clearly, we would not 
explain her behavior as the result of choice, but in some other way: "in-
stinct," or whatever. 
Armed with these common-sensical preliminaries, let us now ask our-
selves if Meyer has indeed made it appear plausible to explain the musical 
parameters of Romanticism as the result of compositional choice predi-
cated upon Romantic political and philosophical ideology. I have chosen 
examples of this compositional choice not only to illustrate the nuts-and-
bolts of Meyer's argument, but to now suggest that there is a gap in the 
argument, which one of them exhibits but the other does not. 
Let us take the successful example first. Meyer's explanation for the 
increasing tendency in the nineteenth century to choose secondary rather 
than primary parameters as structural features was that they more accu-
rately reflected the ideological rejection of conventions and class distinc-
tions and the endorsement of egalitarianism. For the primary parameters 
are rule- and convention-based, while the secondary ones "seem able to 
shape experience with minimal dependence on llearned rules and conven-
tions." 
Now if we are to find the choice explanation plausible, we must be able 
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to give a rational reconstruction of a practical argument that leads from 
ideological belief to compositional choice. And we must be able to plausi-
bly imagine the composer as the kind of person who would be likely to 
have gone through, at one time or another, such a reasoning process. The 
second condition will become crucially relevant when I come to consider 
the limited and global hypotheses. But for now I will put it aside, assuming 
that it is met in the present instance (which I happen to believe is true), 
and concentrate on the first condition. Can we make a rational recon-
struction of a practical argument that leads from belief in the Romantic 
ideology to the compositional choice of secondary over primary param-
eters? I think the answer is yes, and here is how I think it goes, as implied, 
I believe, in what Meyer says. Romantic political and philosophical ideol-
ogy was against class and convention, and basically egalitarian. The Ro-
mantic composers shared this ideology, wished to write music that re-
flected their ideological convictions, and tried to do so. So they chose, 
among other things, to reject the primary, rule- and convention-governed 
parameters in favor of the secondary ones. But what made this a rational 
choice, given their ideological commitment? 
Well, to put it bluntly, if you are ideologically egalitarian, then it is 
reasonable to assume that you endorse music for the masses, not music for 
the elite. But the masses will not have the musical education and experi-
ence of the elite; so, if the music you write is to be accessible to the masses 
(more exactly, in Meyer's terminology, the audience of "elite egalitarians"), 
it must be music that can be enjoyed without any considerable learning or 
experience. The favoring of the secondary over the primary parameters 
now follows as a natural egalitarian strategy. As Meyer points out, the 
primary parameters, being syntactical (which is to say convention- and 
rule-governed) must be learned and can only be appreciated by an elite, 
musically sophisticated audience, whereas the secondary parameters, be-
ing more "natural," do not depend for their appreciation upon learned 
rules and conventions. Thus, given their egalitarian sentiments, the choice 
of secondary over primary parameters on the part of Romantic composers 
seems an entirely rational one. Can the same be said for the choice of 
"convention disguised"? Here I have problems. 
Can we derive from Meyer's text a rational reconstruction of a practical 
argument that goes from Romantic ideology to the use of such disguised 
conventions as are illustrated by the close of Debussy's Prelude to the After-
noon of a Faun? If we cannot, then with regard to these numerous and 
important parameters of Romantic musical style-of which the example 
from Debussy is but one representative instance-the explanation Meyer 
gives of the change from Classic to Romantic style is incomplete and in 
need of fleshing out. I do not say, I hasten to add, that such a fleshing out 
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is impossible. I certainly have no argument to that effect. All I am going to 
suggest is that with regard to the Romantic compositional strategy of dis-
guised conventions as Meyer describes it, there is a crucial step missing 
from the practical argument connecting ideology to compositional choice 
that it mayor may not be possible to provide, and without which the 
rational reconstruction necessary for a plausible choice-based explanation 
is impossible. 
The problem is this. I see no rational connection between embracing 
Romantic ideology-in particular, the rejection of social rules and con-
ventions-and the choice, as a compositional strategy, to use and to dis-
guise rule- and convention-driven musical parameters. Indeed, if one pur-
sues the line of argument just outlined to explain the choice of secondary 
over primary parameters, the choice of disguised primary parameters seems 
positively to contradict Romantic ideology. For if the secondary param-
eters are egalitarian, disguised primary parameters are even more elitist 
than undisguised one, since, one would think, they require even more 
musical sophistication to appreciate. Whatever musical learning and expe-
rience an undisguised musical convention may require for its perception, 
a masked one cannot require less; and, common sense suggests, it must 
require something more, for the result of camouflage is, obviously, to 
make things more rather than less difficult to make out. It would be 
rational for an adherent to Romantic egalitarianism to choose as few con-
ventional formulae as possible. But to disguise the ones chosen would not 
soften the blow; it would, on the contrary, rub salt in the wound. 
What has gone wrong here? The culprit seem to be the use of such 
vague words as "reflect," "compatible," and the like for expressing the 
relationship between musical parameters and ideologies. Why should it be 
a rational strategy for a composer to choose parameters that reflect or are 
compatible with his political and philosophical ideology? Well, that all 
depends upon what the cash value of "reflect" or "compatible" is. For 
under some interpretations of these terms, it would not be a rational, 
which is to say plausible, understandable strategy at all, and hence the 
rational reconstruction of a practical argument from ideology to composi-
tional choice could not go through, leaving a gap in the explanation. To 
illustrate what I am getting at, let me suggest two possible interpretations 
of "reflect" that do make for rational strategies, although, in the event, 
neither seems an acceptable one for disguised conventions. 
We might say that musical parameters reflect an ideology just when 
there is a practical connection between the parameters and the ideology: 
when the ideology implies a musical strategy for effectuating an end that 
the ideology endorses or recommends. The choice of secondary over pri-
mary parameters, because it makes music more accessible to the masses, is 
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an example of just such "practical reflection," as, in a later day, and re-
flecting a similar ideology, was Hanns Eisler's proletarian musical style. 
But, as we have seen, that particular mode of reflection will not work for 
the strategy of disguised conventions. Indeed, from the point of view of 
accessibility, it would seem that the strategy of disguising conventions re-
flects, on the contrary, the elitist ideology and indeed reflects it even more 
strongly than the Classical employment of conventions out front. 
There is, however, a second, obvious way of construing "reflection," 
staring us in the face, that might indeed provide a very plausible practical 
connection between Romantic ideology and the disguising of conventions. 
Why do we not say that the disguised conventions present us aesthetic 
"symbols" or "representations" of the ideological rejection of class distinc-
tions, and the ideological endorsement of natural Man? What better way, 
after all, of symbolizing these things in music than by weaving a musical 
fabric that, although held together by convention-driven parameters, gives 
the appearance of being purely natural and conventionless because those 
parameters have been artfully hidden? And by undertaking the aesthetic 
symbolization or representation of the ideology-since it can be seen, at 
least if certain other conditions obtain, as a rational strategy aimed at 
promulgating what is symbolized or represented-the reconstruction of a 
practical argument from ideology to compositional choice is accomplished, 
and the explanation completed. 
But, alas, the step to symbolization or representation where pure instru-
mental music is concerned is a dangerous one that no music theorist of 
Meyer's sophistication is likely to take very cheerfully. Indeed, I would 
venture to guess that one of Meyer's reasons for choosing such vague and 
noncommittal words as "reflect" and "conform" is just to avoid making a 
commitment to anything so dangerous and problematic as either symbol-
ization or representation, especially where "pure" instrumental music is 
concerned. For the problems that arise in making such claims stick are 
legion. To make the practical argument from ideology to compositional 
choice complete, one must at the very least prove that composers intended 
to symbolize or represent, even if they did not succeed. And, so far as I 
can see, Meyer provides no such proof. So we are again at a loss for a 
rational connection between espousing the Romantic ideology and mak-
ing use, in musical composition, of disguised conventions. Without such a 
connection, the explanation, based on ideology and choice, of how these 
parameters became prevalent remains importantly incomplete, although, 
as I have said before, perhaps not necessarily so. 
At this point, I imagine, the lure of the "unconscious" will strongly 
beckon. One will be tempted to claim that, although there seems to be no 
plausible reason why an adherent to the Romantic ideology should con-
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sciously choose disguised conventions as a compositional strategy, there is 
an unconscious desire, or compulsion, perhaps, !impelling one to use them, 
driven by some unconscious set of "reasons" and "motives" that connect 
the two. Might the disguising of the musical conventions be the expres-
sion of guilt feelings due to a mistaken (and unconscious) belief that to 
use musical conventions is to betray the ideological directive against social 
conventions? We could then liken Debussy's Prelude to the Afternoon of a 
Faun to the compulsive washing of hands thirty times a day by a gentleman 
who unconsciously believes that he is responsible for the death of his 
mother in childbirth and is driven to useless, even damaging behavior by 
the unconscious and mistaken belief that the washing of hands is the 
cleansing of sin. (You don't have to take my example seriously to get my 
point.) 
But such a path, the path of the unconscious, is not open to Meyer. For 
it is the very heart and soul of his book, as I understand it, to divert us 
from such causal explanations based on the paradigms of natural science 
and to direct us to explanation based on the assumption, which I share, 
that "human behavior is the result of intelligent and purposeful-though 
not necessarily deliberate, fully-informed, or even judicious-choice" (p. 
76). An individual choice may indeed not be "deliberate," and in this 
perfectly innocent and non-technical sense be "unconscious," as is Alice's 
choice to instantly run to the right rather than the left to maximize her 
chance of returning Jim's smash. But that is not "unconscious causation" 
in the Freudian or any other psychologically deterministic sense. And in 
order for Alice's response to be correctly described as "choice," there 
must have been some point in her past, as we have seen, before such 
responses were internalized, when Alice's choice was "deliberate." 
Nor, I should point out as a caveat, can one translate this unconscious 
practical argument into a conscious one in order to evade the vagaries of 
the unconscious and solve the present problem, because the practical 
argument will not, if a consciously entertained train of thought, pass mus-
ter as a "rational" one, for the crucial premise that explains the disguising 
of the conventions cannot be plausibly thought to be held consciously-
which is to say reflectively-by a rational, indeed sane person. Who could 
rationally, consciously, reflectively believe that guilt felt over breaking a 
rule can be expiated by hiding the breach from prying eyes (or, in this 
case, ears)? As Meyer points out, the composer's choice need not be 
either "fully-informed, or even judicious" for his argument to go through. 
But it must be within the bounds of what we can plausibly believe a ratio-
nal and sane human being might hold in the relevant time and place; and 
to believe consciously what I have just laid out as a set of unconscious 
beliefs is not within those bounds. 
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The perception that there is some kind of "rightness of fit"-some 
kind, therefore, of rational connection between believing in the Romantic 
rejection of social conventions and choosing the compositional strategy of 
convention disguised-remains a beguiling one. But we should not be 
beguiled too soon. We are owed here, as in any other explanation of 
human behavior made in terms of choice, the spelling out of a plausible, 
rational scenario that makes it plain why a person who believes p, should 
be expected to choose q. I do not think that Meyer, either explicitly or 
implicitly, has given us a scenario to connect belief in the Romantic ideol-
ogy with the compositional choice of disguised conventions. To that ex-
tent, his explanation of how Romantic ideology might "explain" Romantic 
compositional practice is incomplete, though not, perhaps, fatally flawed, 
if completion is possible. 
This brings me to my second problematic. How successful has Meyer 
been in establishing the particular, the limited, or the global hypotheses? 
The particular hypothesis-that Romantic ideology can explain through 
the concept of rational choice the evolution of Classical to Romantic musi-
cal style-fails to be supported whenever there is a gap in the rational 
reconstruction of a practical argument from belief in ideology to choice of 
musical strategy, as there is, so I have argued, in the case of convention 
disguised. But, contrariwise, whenever that reconstruction is complete, as 
it appears to be in the argument from ideology to choice of the secondary 
parameters over the primary ones, the particular hypothesis is confirmed. 
In this particular regard, do Meyer's successes outweigh the failures? My 
own estimate is that more rather than less of the time some kind of 
plausible reconstruction can be made. So this part of Meyer's argument in 
support of the particular hypothesis appears to me to merit a cautiously 
favorable judgement. 
But the rational reconstruction is not, it will be recalled, the only neces-
sary condition for a successful explanation connecting ideology to musical 
parameters by way of choice. Another is that the choosers be the kinds of 
people who we can reasonably assume would go through the kinds of 
deliberation from ideology to musical choice that Meyer describes. How 
does the explanation fare against that requirement? Very well, one would 
think, given how articulate and how prone to aesthetic theorizing the 
Romantic composers were. As Meyer rightly observes, "artists as well as 
aestheticians believed in and fostered the ideology of Romanticism" (p. 
180). And the composers were not laggard in this regard: not by any 
means mere followers, but in the forefront of Romantic speculation, at the 
cutting edge. Berlioz, Schumann, and Wagner (to name merely the most 
prominent of the musical "thinkers") were not content to receive the 
Romantic ideology as a gift from the philosophers, but helped in its forg-
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ing through their voluminous theoretical wntmgs and music cntiCIsm. 
Thus the Romantic composer represents just that type of artist-thinker 
that one can well imagine going through the kind of cerebration from 
ideology to compositional choice that Meyer's account seems to require. 
Here, without a doubt, Meyer holds a winning hand. 
But there's the rub. For just that very special character of the Romantic 
composer and his penchant for theorizing and speculation that make him 
so plausible a subject for Meyer's account of the relation of ideology to 
compositional choice in the nineteenth century make one skeptical of 
finding his like in all music-historical periods or perhaps even in any 
except the one in which the prototype flourished. Given what we know 
about society, musical culture, and intellectual climate in the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, for instance, or in the fifteenth, can 
we plausibly picture to ourselves a J. S. Bach or a Johannes Ockeghem 
making rational compositional choices, regarding the pure musical pa-
rameters, based on serious consideration of philosophical, political, or 
other such over-arching ideologies? Indeed, in the case of Ockeghem, or 
any other composer who did not work in a period when pure instrumental 
forms were an important compositional option, it seems problematic 
whether Meyer's explanation of style change can be applied at all since, as 
Meyer himself points out in explaining why he concentrates for the most 
part on instrumental music in his discussion of the nineteenth century, 
"the connection between compositional restraints and ideological ones 
can be more easily traced when it is not complicated by the further, not 
necessarily congruent, constraints of text setting and theatrical perfor-
mance" (p. 219). Furthermore-and perhaps this is just another way of 
putting the same point-no one thinks it difficult to show how a composer 
of any period responds in musical parameters to the meaning of a text he 
or she is setting. And no one thinks it difficult to show how the meaning 
of a text reflects the regnant ideology of its time, since it has the cognitive 
resources to express fully such an ideology. So that where a text intervenes 
between an ideology and the pure musical parameters, we are not accom-
plishing the really hard and controversial trick of showing how the pure 
musical parameters respond directly to ideological considerations, given 
that these former are bereft of representational Olr semantic possibilities. 
But putting this added complication of text intervention aside, can we 
plausibly picture composers other than those of the Romantic era-who 
lived, after all, in an intellectual climate of just the right kind to nourish 
and nurture the "speculative" artist-going through the ideological delib-
eration necessary to make Meyer's account really work? This is not, I 
hasten to add, merely an idle, groundless question, aimed at raising a little 
skeptical dust. For there is at least some historical evidence to support the 
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notion that before the late eighteenth century-just the time to which 
Meyer begins applying in earnest his explanation of style change through 
ideology and choice-the intellectual climate would not have been such 
as to either produce or encourage the necessary speculative composers, 
whereas the late eighteenth century is exactly the time when one would 
expect such composers to appear. I do not say the evidence is conclusive; 
but it is highly suggestive. 
I have in mind here a seminal two-part article by PaulO. Kristeller in 
which he argued convincingly that what he called "The Modern System of 
the Arts" was a product of Enlightenment thought.! The relevance, for 
present purposes, of Kristeller's discovery, is that before the eighteenth 
century, music was not considered a "fine art" at all, and composers, by 
consequence, were not considered and did not consider themselves "art-
ists." Of course this does not imply that before the eighteenth century 
music was not an art nor composers artists. But it does imply, I want to 
urge, that because composers were considered artists neither by others 
nor by themselves, they would not have had the training or the inclina-
tion, the encouragement, or the precedent to make them think about 
ideological questions at all, let alone to think them relevant to their com-
positional choices of the pure musical parameters. If you think of yourself 
in the social and intellectual class of jewelers and furniture-makers-which 
is to say, craftsmen-rather than in that of poets, you are hardly the sort of 
person likely to speculate in the grand manner, like a Berlioz or a Wagner, 
or even in the clumsy, somewhat illiterate, but nonetheless serious and 
sincere manner of a Beethoven. Indeed, you are not likely to "speculate" 
at all. Plumbers think about pipes, not principles. 
Thus, it was a profound social and intellectual change during the eigh-
teenth century that made the "speculative" composer possible. That, I 
argue, is why it seems unlikely that a composer living before this revolu-
tion took place would have the kind of relation to ideology necessary for 
Meyer'S account to work (allowing always, of course, for exceptions and 
historical anomalies). And that is why, by consequence, it also seems un-
likely to me that the global hypothesis could be true, or the limited hy-
pothesis anything but very limited. 
I do not think the argument I have advanced above is in any way 
conclusive, but merely suggestive. What we must do if we are to verify or 
refute either the global or the limited hypothesis is dig into the historical 
and musical materials the way Meyer has so splendidly done for the Ro-
mantics and see what we come up with. Indeed, it is one of the many 
virtues of Meyer's challenging book and one of its most valuable accom-
plishments that it leaves musicologists and analysts with a research pro-
gram to pursue for many years to come. And I cannot summarize this 
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aspect of Meyer's study more cogently or insightfully than Meyer has him-
self. Of his conclusions, Meyer writes: 
They are hypotheses. Some may be downright wrong, others will 
require refinement. All need to be tested through applications to 
genres and repertoires not considered here. It is a program of work 
to be done, of ideas and hypotheses to be evaluated and perhaps 
rejected, explored and perhaps extended. (P. 352) 
-Peter Kivy 
NOTE 
I "The Modem System of the Arts," Journal oftke History of Ideas 12 (1951): 496-527; 13 
(1952): 17-46. 
